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THE EFFECT OF THE FERES DOCTRINE ON TORT ACTIONS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY FAMILY MEMBERS OF
SERVICEMEN
INTRODUCTION
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a private citizen may
not sue the United States without its consent.1 This doctrine origi-
nated from the medieval notion that because he ruled by divine right,2
"the King could do no wrong."' 3 Adopted into American law by the
Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century,4 sovereign immunity
led to unfortunate consequences. 5 As the activities of government
1. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); Hill v. United States, 50
U.S. 409, 412-13, 9 How. 386, 389 (1850); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 184, 6
Wheat. 264, 411-12 (1821); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895A comment a (1979);
see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 326, 372-73, 377, 9 Wheat. 738,
846-48, 856-57 (1824).
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 45A special note (1979); W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 131, at 970 (4th ed. 1971). The king "'was account-
able only to God by whose grace he ruled." Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or
History?, 30 Nat'l A. Claimants' Couns. Am. L.J. 404, 406 (1964).
3. 86 Cong. Rec. 12,018 (1940) (statement of Rep. Michener); W. Prosser,
supra note 2, § 131, at 970; see Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 45A special note
(1979); Pound, supra note 2, at 406. See generally 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 458-69 (3d ed. 1927) (discussion of origins of sovereign immunity). It
was not until the seventeenth century, a period during which subjects regarded their
king as the ruler of a modern national state, that this notion of the king's infallibility
became fully established in the law. Id. The harsh consequences of this doctrine,
however, were mitigated by the qualification that for every act of the king, some
minister was always responsible. See 6 W. Holdsworth, supra, at 266-67. It has been
suggested that the doctrine has its roots in Roman law. Parker, The King Does No
Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 167, 167 (1952).
4. As early as 1821, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821),
Chief Justice Marshall declared that no suit could be commenced or prosecuted
against the United States without its consent. Id. at 184, 6 Wheat. at 411-12. Later,
in Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868), the Court held that the
government was immune from all liability in tort. Id. at 275-76. The theoretical
underpinning of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, conflicts with the
political theory of democracy upon which our nation is based, Parker, supra note 3,
at 167; see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); Jaffee, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19-20 & n.59
(1963); Note, Military Rights Under the FTCA, 43 St. John's L. Rev. 455, 456 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Military Rights], and therefore its acceptance into American law
is bewildering. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895A comment a (1979); W. Prosser,
supra note 2, § 131, at 971. For a discussion of several justifications that have been
given for the acceptance of the doctrine, see 1 L. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort
Claims: Administrative and Judicial Remedies § 51, at 2-5 n.12 (1982).
5. 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 51, at 2-5 to -6.
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spread,6 the volume of claims against it increased sharply. 7 While
contract actions could be brought against the government since 1855,8
relief in tort could only be obtained by petitioning Congress to permit
a lawsuit or to allocate public funds to compensate innocent victims
wronged by government action.9 Because these claims were abso-
lutely barred absent such legislative consent and because Congress was
an inadequate forum for the resolution of these claims,' 0 "a serious
gap in the administration of justice" arose." Moreover, the duty to
adjudicate these claims became a severe burden on the legislative
body; 12 by the 1930's Congress had to rule on over 2000 such bills each
year.' 3 To relieve Congress of this intolerable burden and "to miti-
gate the unreasonable consequences of sovereign immunity from
suit," ' 4 Congress in 1946 enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act
6. Unlike feudal society in which the king had but a limited function, see
Pound, supra note 2, at 406, the modern state increasingly took over much of that
which had been done by private enterprise. Id. at 409. Military Rights, supra note 4,
at 456-57; see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); Jaffee v. United
States, 592 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); 1 L. Jayson,
supra note 4, § 52, at 2-6.
7. 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 52, at 2-6; see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 139-40 (1950); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 961 (1979).
8. Established by the Court of Claims Act, Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612,
the Court of Claims was granted jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims
founded "upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United
States." Id. Although initially the court's determination could not be effective until
Congress acted thereon, id., Congress amended the Act in 1863 to provide that the
judgments of the Court of Claims shall be final. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765.
With the passage of the Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.), federal district courts were granted concurrent jurisdiction
with that of the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (.1976).
9. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895A comment a (1979); 1 L. Jayson, supra
note 4, § 51, at 2-6; Pound, supra note 2, at 409.
10. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); 86 Cong. Rec. 12,023 (1940)
(statement of Rep. Vorys); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895A comment a (1979);
Military Rights, supra note 4, at 456-57.
11. Pound, supra note 2, at 409; accord 86 Cong. Rec. 12,016 (1940) ("Many
unfortunate men have been deprived of the opportunity or the right to obtain redress
from the Government. This is manifestly unfair and unjust ....") (statement of
Rep. Sabath); id. at 12,026 ("[T]he present system is so inequitable and results in
such unfair consequences.") (statement of Rep. McLaughlin); see 1 L. Jayson, supra
note 4, § 51, at 2-5.
12. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895A comment a (1979); 1 L. Jayson, supra
note 4, § 52, at 2-6 to -9; Wright, The Growth of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24
JAG 151, 151 (1970).
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
14. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979); accord Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 495 (8th Cir. 1980)
(rehearing en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007,
1009 (5th Cir. 1980); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 769
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945); Wright, supra
note 12, at 152.
THE FERES DOCTRINE
(FTCA), 15 under which the federal government waived its immunity
from suits in tort for negligence.' 6
The FTCA is not, however, a complete waiver of sovereign immu-
nity from tort claims; it is limited by statutory17 and judicial' excep-
tions.' 9 One important exception bars certain claims against the
military. In its seminal decision of Feres v. United States,20 the Su-
15. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
16. Congress consented to liability "for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976): see id. § 2674. Between the years 1946 and
1974, the FTCA permitted only those actions sounding in negligence. In 1974,
however, Congress amended the FTCA to cover certain intentional torts committed
by federal investigative or law enforcement officers. Pub. L. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50
(1974) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976)). Congress had earlier waived sover-
eign immunity with respect to actions in contract, see supra note 8, and certain
limited torts. Public Vessels Act, ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (codified as amended
at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1976)); Suits in Admiralty Act, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (1920)
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976)). See generally 1 L. Jayson,
supra note 4, §§ 53-55 (history of statutory waiver of sovereign immunity).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). The FTCA excludes three general categories of
claims:(1) those arising out of the performance of discretionary functions or duties,
id. § 2680(a); (2) those arising out of particular areas of governmental activity,
including "loss [or] miscarriage [of] postal matter," id. § 2680(b), "'assessment or
collection of any tax or customs duty," id. § 2680(c), 'imposition or establishment of
a quarantine," id. § 2680(f), "fiscal operations of the Treasury,- id. § 26S0(i),
"combatant activities of the [armed forces]," id. § 2680 (j), activities **in a foreign
country," id. § 2680(k); and activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority, id. § 26S0
(1), the Panama Canal Company, id. § 2680(n), and a federal land or federal
intermediate credit bank, id. § 2680(n); and (3) those arising out of certain types of
torts, such as admiralty suits "for which a remedy is provided," id. § 2680(d), and
"assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights." Id. § 2680(h). See generally 2 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 235-266 (discussion
of statutory exceptions to the FTCA).
18. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 14445 (1950) (construing the FTCA to
exutlude claims for personal injury or death of servicemen incurred as an incident to
military service); Preferred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir.)
(construing the FTCA to exclude claims for property damage incurred incident to
military service), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837 (1955); see Johansen v. United States,
343 U.S. 427, 439-40 (1952) (claims covered by the Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion Act (FECA), ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742 (1916) (codified in part as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), not recoverable under the FTCA). See generally 2 L.
Jayson, supra note 4, § 237 (discussion of implied exceptions to the FTCA).
19. If a claim falls within any exception to the FTCA, sovereign immunity has
not been waived and the court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. United States
v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-15 (1976); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30-
31 (1953).
20. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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preme Court held that the FTCA did not waive sovereign immunity
with respect to injuries incurred by servicemen incident to their mili-
tary service.2 1 The effect of the Feres decision on tort suits against the
government brought by family members of servicemen has been the
source of much litigation. Members of a serviceman's family have
been permitted to bring suit against the United States for personal
injuries or property damage caused directly to them or their property,
independent of any injury to the serviceman, 22 if such injuries arise
from non-combatant activities. 23 Conversely, they have been barred
from recovery where the cause of action is derivative of the service-
man's action for his own injury.2 4 Most derivative injury cases in-
volve a wrongful death action brought by the wife or child of the
deceased serviceman, 2 although courts also deny recovery for other
21. Id. at 146.
22. 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 156; e.g., Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d
978, 979-80 (4th Cir.1977) (retired military officer's dependent injured as a result of
medical malpractice); Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804, 805 (1st Cir. 1970)
(serviceman's child died after being refused admission to military hospital); Arren-
dale v. United States, 469 F. Supp. 883, 884 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (injuries to service-
man's son as a result of medical malpractice); Steele v. United States, 463 F. Supp.
321, 322, 330 (D. Alaska 1978) (same); Jones v. United States, 236 F. Supp, 756, 757-
59 (E.D.N.C. 1964) (serviceman's wife injured in auto accident). Similarly, the
serviceman has recovered for damages sustained by him as a result of injuries to Ills
wife or child. 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 156; e.g., Fournier v. United States, 220 F.
Supp. 752, 753-55 (S.D. Miss. 1963); Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp.
543, 549-50 (D. Miss. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952); Messer v. United
States, 95 F. Supp. 512, 513 (N.D. Fla. 1951).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976). The FTCA expressly excludes "[a]ny claim arising
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,
during time of war." Id.
24. E.g., De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972); Shaw v. United States, 448 F.2d 1240, 1241-42
(4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171, 172-73 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961); Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 530-
31 (D. Conn. 1979), ajf'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828
(1980); Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599, 600-01 (E.D. Wis. 1976). In
fact, many courts do not treat the family member's cause of action as independent of
the serviceman's. See, e.g., Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171, 172-74 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961); Watkins v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 980, 985-
89 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1979); Knight v. United
States, 361 F. Supp. 708, 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), afJ'd mem., 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.
1973); Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per
curiam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).
25. Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 535 (D. Conn. 1979), a'ffd
mere., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980); e.g., Parker v.
United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980); Daberkow v. United States, 581
F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1978); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 605 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Eckles v. United States, 471 F. Supp.




injuries suffered by family members, such as loss of consortium, men-
tal anguish and marital disharmony.26
Recently, courts have been called to decide a new question:
Whether family members of servicemen can seek recovery under the
FTCA for physical injuries incurred as a result of the government's
negligent conduct with respect to the serviceman.2 7 Typically, these
cases involve children of servicemen who have suffered genetic injury
and birth defects resulting from negligent exposure of the father to
radiation or toxic chemicals.2 8  Some courts confronted with such
physical injury claims apply an incident-to-service test and find that
because the origin of the family member's injury is a service-related
injury, the claim is barred by Feres.29 Other courts consider whether
the factors underlying the Feres rule justify its application in this new
context. 30  Courts that have adopted this latter approach have
reached conflicting results.
3 1
26. De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1239-40 (ist Cir.) (per curiam)
(mental anguish and loss of companionship), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("loss of
society, comfort, companionship, services, consortium, guidance and support");
Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 531 (D. Conn. 1979) (loss of consor-
tium), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980);
Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599, 600-01 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (marital
disharmony).
27. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982); Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 281
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 921 (D.D.C. 1981); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2,
1980); see Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 963 (1975).
28. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981) (radiation), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982); Hinkie v. United States, 524 F.
Supp. 277, 278-79 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same); Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp.
918, 921 (D.D.C. 1981) (same); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Agent Orange). But the cases are not limited to this
fact pattern. See Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir. 1974) (wife's
action for costs of pregnancy and childraising caused by negligent vasectomy on
serviceman), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975); Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-
271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980) (family's action for hepatitis
contracted after negligent failure to diagnose serviceman's hepatitis).
29. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); Monaco v. United States, No. C-79-0860-SW, slip op. at 3-4(N.D. Cal. Nov.
2, 1979), aff'd, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S.
May 24, 1982); see Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975).
30. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282-85 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Lombard
v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 921-22 (D.D.C. 1981); Jessup v. United States,
No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980).
31. Compare Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 279, 285 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (action brought by serviceman's child for birth defects granted), with Lombard
v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 921-22 (D.D.C. 1981) (action brought by
serviceman's children for mutagenic damages barred).
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Part I of this Note examines the application of the Feres doctrine to
claims brought by dependents of servicemen and argues that an inci-
dent-to-service analysis should be replaced by a consideration of the
factors that underlie the Feres doctrine. Part II contends that the
Feres factor analysis adequately balances the government's interest in
avoiding any impairment of its vital functions against the purpose of
the FTCA, which is to provide a remedy to victims of the govern-
ment's negligence. This Note concludes that under such an analysis
family members of servicemen should be granted a cause of action for
physical injuries incurred as a result of the government's negligence
toward an active duty serviceman.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE Feres DOCTrIUNE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
CLAIMS BY FAMILY MEMBERS
In Brooks v. United States,32 the Supreme Court first considered
whether members of the armed forces had a right to sue the govern-
ment under the FTCA. 33 The Court held that two servicemen could
recover under the Act for injuries sustained while on furlough.3 4 Both
the language of the FTCA35 and its legislative history 36 persuaded the
Court to grant the tort actions. Recognizing the possible implications
of its decision, 37 however, the Court explicitly reserved the question
whether an action would lie under the FTCA for injuries sustained
incident to active military service .3
32. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
33. Id. at 50. This question was left open by Congress. Although the FTCA
explicitly excludes "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war," 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976),
there is no exception for all actions by members of the military. See 337 U.S. at 51.
34. 337 U.S. at 50-51. Two brothers, Welker and Arthur Brooks, were riding in
their automobile along a public highway when a negligently operated army truck
crashed into their vehicle. Arthur was killed; Welker was seriously injured. Id. at 50.
35. Id. at 51. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for any claim based on
negligence brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). Noting
that "[t]he statute's terms are clear," the Court was "not persuaded that 'any claim'
means 'any claim but that of servicemen.' " 337 U.S. at 51. Moreover, because the
FTCA includes an exception for combatant activities, 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976), the
Court stated that "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have the
servicemen in mind" when it enacted the FTCA. 337 U.S. at 51.
36. 337 U.S. at 51-52. Noting that of the eighteen tort claims bills introduced in
Congress between 1925 and 1935, "[a]ll but two contained exceptions denying recov-
ery to members of the armed forces," id. at 51 & nn.2-3, and that the military
exception had been dropped when the present FTCA was first introduced, id. at 51-
52, the Court reasoned that Congress must have intended the FTCA to cover military
claims that are not service-connected. Id.
37. Id. at 52 ("The Government envisages dire consequences should we reverse
the judgment. A battle commander's poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand,





A year after Brooks, this "wholly different case" 39 presented itself to
the Supreme Court in Feres v. United States.4 0 Before the Court were
three separate claims; two involved claims of medical malpractice,
the other claim charged that the serviceman was housed in unsafe
barracks. 41 The Court denied all three actions, stating that the FTCA
does not cover "injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service.114 2  The Feres Court
based its decision primarily on two factors. First, it considered the
availability of veterans' benefits, and concluded that because of the
absence of any statutory method of adjustment between these benefits
and FTCA recoveries, Congress did not intend the FTCA to permit
recovery for injuries incident to military service.4 3 Second, the Court
noted that liability under the FTCA is determined under the law of
the state in which the negligence occurred,4 4 but found that the
relationship between the government and members of its armed forces
is " 'distinctively federal in character.' "4 The Court concluded that
the law governing that relationship should therefore be derived from
federal sources and not from state law, as would be required under
the FTCA. 46
Four years after its decision in Feres, the Court, in United States v.
Brown,47 suggested a third rationale for the military exception to the
FTCA. The Brown Court justified the Feres decision on the theory
that suits brought against the United States for service-related injuries
39. Id.
40. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
41. Feres was the consolidation of three cases. See Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 136-37 (1950). In Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd,
340 U.S. 135 (1950), Feres' wife brought a wrongful death action against the United
States for the death of her husband, who had perished by fire in army barracks while
on active duty. Id. at 536. In Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), a serviceman sued the
United States for damages arising from a towel that was negligently left in his
stomach during an abdominal operation by an army surgeon. Id. at 518-19. In
Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), Griggs' wife brought a wrongful death action against the
government for the death of her husband, who allegedly died while on active duty as
a result of negligent medical treatment. Id. at 2.
42. 340 U.S. at 146; accord Carter v. City of Cheyenne, 649 F.2d 827, 829 (10th
Cir. 1981); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1980); De Font
v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
910 (1972); Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171, 173-74 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 874 (1961).
43. 340 U.S. at 144-45.
44. Id. at 142-43. The Act provides that "the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred" governs the issue of liability. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
45. 340 U.S. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
305-06 (1947)).
46. Id. at 143-44.
47. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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would adversely affect the maintenance of military discipline.4 8 In
Brown, however, a discharged veteran claimed that he had received
negligent medical treatment at a Veterans' Administration hospital
for an injury he had incurred several years earlier while on active
military duty. 49 Because the veteran enjoyed a civilian status and
hence was not subject to military discipline, the Court permitted his
action,50 thus refuting an inference that Feres had overruled Brooks.,1
The Supreme Court left to the lower federal courts the task of
deciding whether a given claim falls within the Feres ruling or within
the ambit of Brooks and Brown.52  To accomplish this task, most
courts have focused on whether a particular claim arises out of activ-
ity incident to military service; if the claim is found to be service-
related, then it is held to be barred by Feres.5 3 Such an approach
emphasizes the Feres holding, not its rationale. 4 In cases brought by
48. Id. at 112.
49. Id. at 110.
50. Id. at 112-13.
51. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Parker v. United
States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1980); Crumpler v. United States, 495 F. Supp.
266, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
52. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53. E.g., Carter v. City of Cheyenne, 649 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1981); Parker
v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980); De Font v. United States, 453
F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972); Callaway
v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 774-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Gursley v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 614, 614-17 (D. Colo. 1964). See generally 1
L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 155 (discussion of the ncident-to-service test).
54. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013-15 (5th Cir. 1980);
Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 776-78 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1016 (1972); Kessler v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (D.S.C.
1981); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 774-76 (E.D.N.Y.
1980). Courts have considered various factors to determine whether an injury is
service-related, including the military status of the claimant, .compare Stansberry v.
Middendorf, 567 F.2d 617, 618 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (servicemen's action for
injuries resulting from automobile accident while on active duty barred), with
Barnes v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 51, 55 (W.D. Ky. 1952) (serviceman's action
for injuries resulting from automobile accident while on a pass granted), the situs of
the injury, compare Watkins v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 980, 986 (S.D. Ga. 1977)
(wife's action for death of serviceman resulting from motorcycle accident that oc-
curred on a military base barred), aff'd per curiam, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1979),
with Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (family's
action for death of serviceman resulting from automobile accident that occurred on a
publicly used road granted), and the claimant's activity at the time he was injured.
Compare Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46, 47 (D. Conn. 1971) (parent's action for
death of serviceman arising out of combatant activities in Vietnam barred), afJ'd,
455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972), with Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1014-15
(5th Cir. 1980) (wife's action for death of serviceman resulting from automobile
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servicemen, courts generally give the phrase "incident to service" a
broad construction, resulting in the rather pro forma denial of such
claims.5 The incident-to-service approach has also been used to bar
claims brought against the United States by non-military personnel.
For example, wrongful death actions brought by family members of
servicemen have been barred by the Feres rule, even when those
claims were independent of any claim of the servicemen's estates,57
because the "genesis [of these claims] must go back to the in-service
injury."'5 8  It is based on this "genesis-incident-to-service" test59 that
courts have barred claims brought by dependents of servicemen for
accident while driving toward his home granted). The incident-to-service test has
been criticized as being "amorphous," 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 155.01, at 5-65;
accord Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. Rev. 24, 29
(1976), thus making it "difficult to determine whether or not a particular claim is
barred." 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 155.01, at 5-65. Not all courts, however, have
applied the incident-to-service test. Bradshaw v. United States, 443 F.2d 759, 762-63
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (work-related-injury test); Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355, 358(th Cir. 1969) (incident-to-military-duty test).
55. Alexander v. United States, 500 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1107 (1975); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 775
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Rhodes, supra note 54, at 30, 41; see, e.g., Hass v. United States,
518 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (4th Cir. 1975) (action for injuries resulting from riding a
horse rented from a military riding stable barred); Henninger v. United States, 473
F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir.) (action for malpractice during process of serviceman's
discharge barred), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); Lowe v. United States, 440
F.2d 452, 452-53 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (action for injuries arising from elective
surgery two months before termination of enlistment barred), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
833 (1971); Mariano v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 316, 316-17, 320 (E.D. Va. 1977)
(action brought by off-duty serviceman for injuries incurred while employed at
servicemen's club barred), aff'd, 605 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1979); Degentesh v. United
States, 230 F. Supp. 763, 764-65 (N.D. I11. 1964) (action for injuries arising from a
bus accident that occurred while riding to a military-sponsored beach party barred).
56. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Monaco v. United States, No. C-79-0860-SW, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 1979), aff'd, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982); Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 534-36 (D.
Conn. 1979), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980);
see Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599, 601 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
57. De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972); Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir.
1960); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 780 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 190 (D. Md. 1980).
58. Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1960).
59. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In essence,
under the "genesis-incident-to-service" test, the family member stands in the shoes of
the serviceman. Thus, if the serviceman would be barred from bringing suit because
his injury was incident to his military service, so is his dependent. Because the phrase
"incident to service" is broadly defined where servicemen are involved, see supra note
55 and accompanying text, claims by family members are usually denied under this
test. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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other derivative injuries, including loss of consortium, mental anguish
and marital disharmony.60 Recently, two courts denied tort recovery
to servicemen's children who suffered permanent birth defects as a
result of their fathers' exposure to harmful substances while serving in
the military. 61 They reasoned that the injuries were "directly related
to and arose out of the injuries sustained by [their fathers] at the time
[they were] member[s] of the United States Army. '" ' 2
The rote application of the incident-to-service approach to claims
brought by members of a serviceman's family, however, is improper0 3
in light of the Supreme Court's analysis of Feres in Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States.6 4 The Stencel Court held that a
government contractor could not seek indemnity from the United
States for damages it may have been required to pay to a serviceman
60. De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.) (per curiam)
(mental anguish and loss of consortium), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 780-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (loss
of society, comfort, companionship, services, consortium, guidance and support);
Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 535-36 (D. Conn. 1979) (loss of
consortium), 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 4,49 U.S. 828 (1980).
61. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); Monaco v. United States, No. C-79-0860-SW, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
2, 1979), aff'd, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S.
May 24, 1982).
62. Monaco v. United States, No. C-79-0860-SW, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2,
1979), aff'd, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May
24, 1982). For the same reason, the court in Agent Orange, relying on Monaco,
denied a cause of action under the FTCA to children of servicemen who incurred
genetic injury and birth defects allegedly as a result of their parents' negligent
exposure to Agent Orange. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp.
762, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The court in Agent Orange further justified applying the
genesis of injury test on the grounds that it would avoid subjecting the government to
unlimited liability. Id. at 781. The court argued that to permit children to sue under
the FTCA for genetic injuries caused by the serviceman's exposure to radiation
"might open the door for governmental liability to countless generations of claim-
ants." Id; accord Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 921 (D.D.C. 1981). A
similar argument was raised during the congressional debates concerning the merits
of the FTCA. Some congressmen expressed concern that the waiver of governmental
immunity from suits in tort would lead to an inordinate increase in the number of
claims against the United States at great cost to the government. 86 Cong. Rec.
12,025 (1940) (statements of Rep. Taber and Rep. Cochran). But this argument was
summarily rejected. "Objection has been made ... on the score of predicted expense
[to the government] .... Nobody should object on the score of expense even if it
came. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum-let justice be done though the heavens fall. It is an
ancient and honorable maxim. Remember the pledge of King John at Runnymede:
'To no man will we deny right or justice.' Least of all should Congress, the voice of
the Nation, be silent when justice is at stake." Id. at 12,026 (statement of Rep. Luce).
63. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v.
United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980).
64. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
1250 [Vol. 50
1982] THE FERES DOCTRINE 1251
for injuries incurred by the serviceman while on active duty.05 Al-
though the serviceman's claim against the United States had been
barred by the lower court as incident to service,"" the Supreme Court
did not utilize an incident-to-service test in analyzing the corpora-
tion's indemnity claim.67  Rather, the Court stated that "[i]t is neces-
sary .. . to examine the rationale of Feres to determine to what
extent, if any, allowance of [the] claim would circumvent the pur-
poses of the Act as . . . construed by the [Feres] Court."681 In deter-
mining that the third-party indemnity claim was barred by Feres, the
Stencel Court considered the availability of veterans' benefits, 69 the
distinctively federal relationship between the claimant and the mili-
tary,70 and the anticipated effect of tort suits on military discipline. 1
65. Id. at 673-74. The serviceman suffered permanent injuries when the ejection
system of his fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a midair emergency. Id. at 667.
He brought suit against the United States and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp., the
manufacturer of the ejection system. Id. at 668. Because Stencel manufactured the
system pursuant to the government's specifications and used components provided by
the government, Stencel cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity. Id. at
667-68. Both the serviceman's claim and Stencel's cross-claim against the United
States were dismissed on summary judgment. Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp.
52, 53 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub non. Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The only issue before the
Court was whether Stencel had the right to seek indemnity. 431 U.S. at 669.
66. Donham v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 52, 53 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 536
F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666 (1977).
67. See 431 U.S. at 671-72: Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
68. 431 U.S. at 670. By its decision in Stencel, the Court, despite widespread
criticism of the Feres rule by lower courts, see Torres v. United States, 621 F.2d 30,
32 (1st Cir. 1980); Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1980);
Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 879 (1973), and commentators, Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Mili-
tary Personnel, 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 316 (1954); Rhodes, supra note 54; Note, From
Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (1979) [hereinafter cited as From Feres to Stencel]; Military
Rights, supra note 4, reaffirmed and strengthened the Feres rationale. Harrison v.
United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd meem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980); see Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d
785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1978); Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa.
1981); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 773 n.16
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
69. 431 U.S. at 673. The Court noted that the Veterans' Benefits Act "pro'ides
an upper limit of liability for the Government as to service-connected injuries." Id.
Because the injured serviceman had already received veterans' benefits for his inju-
ries, the Court stated that "[t]o permit [the corporation's] claim [for indemnity]
would circumvent this limitation." Id.
70. Id. at 672. Concluding that "[t]he relationship between the Government and
its suppliers of ordnance is certainly no less 'distinctively federal in character' than
the relationship between the Government and its soldiers," the Court reasoned that
because "it makes no sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence
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It is this analysis of the Feres factors, not the incident-to-service
approach, that should determine whether a cause of action exists
under the FTCA For injuries to non-military personnel. 72 The me-
chanical application of the incident-to-service rule to suits by depen-
dents of servicemen may well lead to a result different from that
which would be reached by analyzing the Feres factors. 73 Moreover,
the genesis-incident-to-service test, by oversimplifying Feres and ig-
to affect the liability of the Government to a serviceman who sustains service-
connected injuries, . . it makes equally little sense to permit that situs to affect the
Government's liability to a Government contractor for the identical injury." Id.
(citation omitted).
71. Id. at 673. The Court observed that "where the case concerns an injury
sustained by a soldier while on duty," the trial would necessarily "involve second-
guessing military orders, and would often require members of the Armed Services to
testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions." Id. These adverse effects of
judicial scrutiny on military discipline, the Court noted, "weigh[ed] against permit-
ting any recovery." Id.
72. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see Miller v.
United States, 643 F.2d 481, 493-95 (8th Cir. 1980); Daberkow v. United States, 581
F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1978); Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 921-
22 (D.D.C. 1981); Crumpler v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 2, 1980); Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Conn. 1979),
aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980). The Agent
Orange court, however, refused to weigh and consider the Feres factors. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Focusing on the
servicemen's claims for their own service-connected injuries, the court deemed it
unnecessary "to reargue the underlying rationale of Feres" because "neither the
Court nor Congress itself has altered Feres' basic holding." Id. at 773. Although this
reasoning is persuasive when the claim is brought by the serviceman himself or by the
serviceman's dependents for wrongful death, it is wholly inapposite when the claim is
brought by family members of servicemen for their own physical injuries because
such an extension of the Feres doctrine to third parties involves no questioning of
Feres' basic holding with respect to servicemen. In Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d
1007 (5th Cir. 1980), a wrongful death action brought by the serviceman's wife, the
Fifth Circuit did examine the Feres factors, but ruled that although they justified the
Feres doctrine, they were not helpful in ascertaining when an injury was incurred
incident to service. Id. at 1011-13. Thus, Parker actually relied on the incident-to-
service holding of Feres, not its underlying rationale, id. at 1013-15, in contrast with
the analysis in Stencel. In this particular case, focusing on incident-to-service is not
necessarily improper, however, because being a wrongful death action like Feres,
Parker involved no extension of the Feres case. See supra note 41.
73. Compare Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (10th Cir. 1974) (wife's
action for costs of pregnancy and child-raising caused by negligent vasectomy per-
formed on serviceman barred under incident-to-service approach), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 963 (1975), and In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 781
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (children's action for birth defects caused by fathers' exposure to
Agent Orange barred under the incident-to-service approach), with Hinkie v. United
States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282-85 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (son's action for birth defects caused
by father's exposure to radiation granted under the Ferem factors analysis), and Jessup
v. United States, Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980)
(family's action for hepatitis contracted by failure to diagnose serviceman's hepatitis
granted under the Feres factors analysis).
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noring the factor analysis utilized in Stencel, loses sight of the policies
underlying the Feres decision.74
I. THE FERES Factors
Conflicting public policies underlie the issue of whether, and under
what circumstances, members of a serviceman's family have the right
to bring an action in tort against the United States. 75  Congress
waived sovereign immunity in tort for negligence in order to promote
justice by providing an adequate remedy to those injured by employ-
ees or agents of the government. 76  Yet, certain tort actions against
the United States may impair the ability of the military to maintain
national security.77 Despite much confusion as to their meaning and
relevance, 78 the factors that underlie the Feres doctrine and that were
reaffirmed in Stencel provide a framework for balancing these con-
flicting social policies.
A. The Veterans' Benefits Act
The Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA)79 provides compensation to any
veteran injured in the line of duty80 and pays death benefits to the
74. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
75. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 45A special note (1979); Pound, supra
note 2, at 416.
76. See Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957); Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009
(5th Cir. 1980); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 769
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946). It is clear from
the legislative history that a leading aim of the FTCA was to relieve persons injured
by government negligence of an inequitable burden. 86 Cong. Rec. 12,015-32 (1940)
(floor debate). "Many unfortunate men have been deprived of the opportunity or the
right to obtain redress from the Government. This is manifestly unfair and unjust
and under [the FTCA] such injustices will be done away with and justice will be
forthcoming to men who, through no fault of their own, have suffered injury or have
a justifiable claim against the Government." Id. at 12,016 (statement of Rep. Sa-
bath). "The Attorney General ... urged the passage of [the FTCA] because of the
fact that the present system is so inequitable and results in such unfair consequences."
Id. at 12,026 (statement of Rep. McLaughlin).
77. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977);
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d
712, 717 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Jefferson v. United States, 178
F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), affd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950); Pound, supra note 2, at 416.
78. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982); Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir.
1974) (per curiam); Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815-16 & n.2 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); see Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580,
584-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 155.05.
79. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1976).
80. Id. § 331.
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surviving spouse or children of any veteran who dies as the result of
injury incurred in the line of duty."' The effect of veterans' benefits
on tort recovery under the FTCA is unclear. Congress was silent on
the issue,12 and the Supreme Court has been woefully inconsistent in
defining the nature of the relationship between the VBA and the
FTCA. In Brooks v. United States,8 3 the Court refused to characterize
the VBA as an exclusive remedy,84 but rather indicated that recovery
under the FTCA should be reduced by the amounts that the United
States paid under the VBA. 85  One year later, however, the Feres
Court retreated from the Brooks position, 8  reasoning that because
Congress did not provide a way to adjust veterans' benefits with
FTCA recoveries, the FTCA must not have been intended to cover
service-related injuries. 87 Despite the Feres decision, the Court, in
United States v. Brown,8 was quick to reaffirm the position enunci-
ated in Brooks. 89 Although Brown led to a de-emphasis of the signifi-
cance of the VBA factor as a justification of the Feres rule, 0 the
Supreme Court in Stencel revived and extended the reasoning of
Feres. The Stencel Court noted that one of the essential features of the
VBA was to provide "an upper limit of liability for the Government as
to service-connected injuries."91 To allow additional recovery under
the FTCA would be to remove the" 'protective mantle of the [VBA's]
limitation-of-liability provisions.' "92
Some courts, broadly interpreting Stencel, have held that the VBA
is the exclusive remedy regardless of who brings the action and
81. Id. § 341.
82. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954); Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53
(1949); Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
83. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 53-54.
86. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
87. Id.
88. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
89. Id. at 113; accord Mosley v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D.N.C.
1974). Reaffirming its decision in Brown, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), stated that "the presence of a compensation system,
persuasive in Feres, does not of necessity preclude a suit for negligence." Id. at 160.
90. Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971), afJ'd per
curiam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972); 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 155.05, at 5-89 to
-90.
91. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).




whether the injured person is eligible for veterans' benefits.9 3 Such an
interpretation of Stencel, however, is unwarranted. In Stencel, the
corporation's cross-claim was against the United States for indemnifi-
cation;94 the only injury involved was that of the serviceman. 5  Be-
cause the injured serviceman had already received substantial vet-
erans' benefits for his injuries,96 to allow the corporation's indemnity
action under the FTCA would have required the government to pay
twice for the one injury. Unlike an injury to a serviceman, however, a
physical injury to a serviceman's family member is not covered by the
VBA.97 Thus, to permit such actions would not subject the United
States to double liability, and therefore would not contravene the
VBA's purpose of limiting the government's liability.
Moreover, the view that the VBA is the exclusive remedy imputes a
characteristic to the VBA that Congress may never have intended.
Because Congress did not speak to the issue,98 the VBA's exclusivity is
at best questionable. Significantly, the Feres Court, admitting that
93. Carter v. City of Cheyenne, 649 F.2d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 1981); see United
States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053
(1969); Harrison v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 529, 535 (D. Conn. 1979), aJf'd
mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828 (1980).
94. See supra note 65.
95. 431 U.S. at 672-74. As the Court noted, "the right of a third party to recover
in an indemnity action against the United States ... must be held limited Biy the
rationale of Feres where the injured party is a serviceman." Id. at 674 (emphasis
added). Stencel claimed that it was merely passively negligent and that because "the
malfunctioning system had been in the exclusive custody and control of the United
States since the time of its manufacture," it was the government's active negligence
that caused the injury to the serviceman. Id. at 668. Therefore, Stencel sought
indemnity for damages it might have to pay to the serviceman from the United
States, the party more responsible for the serviceman's injuries. Id.
96. Id. at 667-68. The serviceman was awarded a lifetime pension of approxi-
mately $1,500 per month. Id.
97. See Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 134 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982); Hinlde v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277,
283 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at
2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980). Dependents of servicemen are entitled only to death
benefits under the VBA. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. They may,
however, seek compensation for their personal injuries by petitioning Congress to
enact private bills of relief. In Monaco, the court, although holding that "the
doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents [the serviceman's daughter] from recovering
for her injury in the federal courts," encouraged her "to pursue any legislative
remedies available to her." 661 F.2d at 134 n.3. The court admitted, however, that
her chance of obtaining reparation was "unclear, but not without hope." Id. In
Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
879 (1973), the court, admitting that "the facts pleaded here, if true, cry out for a
remedy," noted that "[p]ossibly the only route to relief is by an application to
Congress." Id. at 606. For a complete discussion of the cumbersome procedure
involved in obtaining a private bill of relief, see 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 21.02.
98. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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there was as much statutory authority for nonexclusivity as for exclu-
sivity, implicity limited its finding in favor of the latter to injuries
"incident to service" that are compensable under the VBA.00 In
addition, it has been argued that Congress could not have intended to
make the VBA the exclusive remedy because at the time of the enact-
ment of the FTCA, compensation under the VBA was neither suffi-
ciently certain nor adequate in amount to justify denying servicemen
the option of tort recovery.100 Furthermore, such a view contradicts
valid Supreme Court precedent. Both Brooks and Brown expressly
refused to make the VBA the exclusive remedy. 1' 1
Courts should heed the Supreme Court's restraint in Brooks and
refuse to treat the VBA as exclusive "when Congress has not done
so."102 The better view considers the fairness of denying a particular
plaintiff's claim in light of the availability of veterans' benefits and
other factors. 0 3 In Stencel, the injured serviceman received substan-
99. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 140, 144 (1950). Discussing the relationship
between the FTCA and the VBA, the Feres Court noted four possibilities available to
the claimant, each of which assumes the potential for VBA compensation. He could
"(a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the
other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the proceeds of the
smaller, or (d) that the compensation and pension remedy excludes the tort remedy."
Id. Recognizing that "[t]here is as much statutory authority for one as for another of
these conclusions," id., the Court reasoned that the failure of Congress to provide
"any provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other" implied that it had
not "contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply in cases of this kind." Id.
(emphasis added). In the cases before the Court in Feres, the claimants had received
veterans' benefits for their service-related injuries. Id. at 144-45. In his Stencel
dissent, Justice Marshall argued that congressional silence supports an inference of
nonexclusivity at least as well as that of exclusivity. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675-76 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
noted that the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742
(1916) (codified in part as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), the compara-
ble compensation system for civilian employees of the federal government, was
expressly made exclusive by Congress, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976). 431 U.S. at 675.
Despite this exclusivity provision, the Court has held that the FECA does not affect
the rights of third parties. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 601
(1963). Justice Marshall criticized the majority's decision in Stencel for its failure to
explain "why the absence of an exclusivity provision in the Veterans' Benefits Act
forecloses suits by third parties in cases involving injuries to military personnel when
the existence of such a clause does not bar similar actions when the injured employee
works for one of the Government's civilian agencies." 431 U.S. at 676 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
100. From Feres to Stencel, supra note 68, at 1105-08.
101. See supra notes 83-85, 88-89 and accompanying text.
102. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
103. See Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Parker v.
United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1980); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d
712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Daberkow v. United States, 581
F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1978); Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 816 & n.2
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp.
277, 283-84 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB,
slip op. at 3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980).
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tial veterans' benefits for his injuries.' 0 4  Although the corporation
was not entitled to benefits under the VBA,' 0s the Court noted that
the relationship between the corporation and the United States was
based on a commercial contract. 10 6 Therefore, because Stencel was
afforded the opportunity to negotiate an indemnity provision that
would have adequately protected it against liability to military per-
sonnel,107 there was "no basis for a claim of unfairness." 108
That denying the tort actions would not result in harsh conse-
quences to the claimants also weighed heavily in the Court's decision
in Feres.10 9 "The primary purpose of the [FTCA]," the Feres Court
explained, "was to extend a remedy to those who had been with-
out.""n0 Mindful of this purpose, the Court reasoned that because the
wives of the deceased servicemen were entitled to and had received
veterans' benefits,"' it would not be unfair to bar their tort recov-
ery. 2
104. See supra note 96.
105. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
106. Id. at 674. Because Stencel contracted with North American Rockwell, the
prime government contractor, to provide the aircraft ejection system, there was no
direct contractual relationship between the United States and Stencel. Id. at 667 n.2.
107. Id. at 674 n.8.
108. Id. at 674 (footnote omitted). But see In re Ionian Glow Marine, Inc., 510 F.
Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1981), in which the court noted that the existence of a contrac-
tual relationship, present in Stencel, was not necessary to bar a third-part' indemnity
suit under the Feres rule. Id. at 200.
109. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950).
110. Id. at 140.
111. Id. at 145. The VBA provides that "[t]he surviving spouse, child or children
... of any veteran who died . . . as the result of injury or disease incurred in or
aggravated by active military, naval, or air service, in line of duty ... shall be
entitled to receive compensation." 38 U.S.C. § 341 (1976).
112. See 340 U.S. at 145. The Court noted that "[t]he compensation Sstem... is
not negligible or niggardly, as these cases demonstrate." Id. It further opined that the
claimants were in fact better off under the VBA because no litigation is required. Id.
Other courts that have denied wrongful death actions have recognized that because
the VBA provides death benefits to wives and children of servicemen, denial of their
claims under the FTCA would not leave them uncompensated. In Daberkow v.
United States, 581 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1978), the wife and son, both United States
citizens, of a West German military officer who was killed in the United States
during a joint military activity brought suit against the government for wrongful
death. Id. at 786. The court noted that the West German government had been
compensating the claimants. Id. at 788. Holding that the claim was barred by the
Feres rule, id., the court reasoned: "While the substitute compensation involved here
does not come from the United States, that fact does not alter our conclusion, because
the presence of this compensation satisfies the purpose of this factor, ensuring com-
pensation for the injured person whatever its source." Id. Similarly, the court in
Shaw v. United States, 448 F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), denied an action
for the wrongful death of a serviceman who died in an accidental fire while confined
to a stockade as a military prisoner because, in part, his confinement "did not affect
his family's entitlement to death benefits." Id. at 1241-42; accord Miller v. United
States, 643 F.2d 481, 494 (8th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en bane).
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Conversely, to bar a claimant who is not entitled to administrative
compensation from suing under the FTCA leaves the claimant reme-
diless.1 3 This result would frustrate the very purpose of the FTCA-
to ensure compensation to those injured by agents or employees of the
United States." 4  Accordingly, courts confronted with non-military
claims are more willing to grant a cause of action to those claimants
who are without other remedies." 5  Under the terms of the VBA,
family members of servicemen are not entitled to any reparation for
their own personal injuries as a result of the government's negligent
conduct with respect to the serviceman."16 As one court noted, even if
the injured serviceman satisfies a particular requirement of the VBA
that would permit him and his dependents to receive additional com-
pensation for his injuries," 7 they still "would be receiving nothing for
their own [personal] injuries."" 8 Thus, in determining whether an
action under the FTCA exists for dependents of servicemen, courts
should give great weight to the fact that the FTCA represents their
only opportunity to obtain relief for the wrongs commited by the
government. "1
113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
114. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); see S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1945); 86
Cong. Rec. 12,016 (1940) (statement of Rep. Sabath); id. at 12,026 (statement of
Rep. McLaughlin).
115. Compare United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 153 (1966) (prisoner who
had received an award for compensation under the prisoner's compensation act, 18
U.S.C. § 4126 (1976), denied action under the FTCA), with United States v. Muniz,
374 U.S. 150, 160 (1963) (prisoners who were not entitled to administrative relief
permitted to seek relief under the FTCA). Reconciling the different results in these
two cases, the Demko Court noted that the prisoners in Muniz "were not protected
by the prison compensation law." 385 U.S. at 153. In Milliken v. United States, 439
F. Supp. 290 (D. Kan. 1976), the court, in granting a serviceman's action to recover
for alleged beatings while confined by the military, noted that there was no statute
under which the serviceman could obtain compensation for his injuries. Id. at 295.
116. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
117. The VBA provides for additional monthly compensation for dependents if the
veteran is entitled to veterans' benefits and his disability is rated not less than 50%.
38 U.S.C. § 335 (1976).
118. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
119. See id.; Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 3 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980). In Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981),
the court recognized that the unavailability of veterans' benefits "supports the plain-
tiffs' position." Id. at 922. Yet the court was quick to point out that this factor "cuts
both ways" because permitting such actions would also frustrate "the government's
interest in limiting liability." Id. The VBA limits the government's liability, how-
ever, only to the extent that a claim is covered by both the VBA and the FTCA. See
supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is clear from the legislative
history that Congress was willing to incur great expense to remedy wrongs committed
by the government. See supra note 62.
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B. Uniformity and the Distinctively Federal Relationship
Under the FTCA, liability depends upon "the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."' 20 The Feres Court expressed
concern about the effects of applying nonuniform state laws to deter-
mine the government's tort liability. Considering the issue from the
perspective of the serviceman, the Court reasoned that it would be
unfair to make the success of a claim dependent upon the claimant's
geographic location, a matter over which a serviceman may well have
little control. 12  In cases subsequent to Feres, however, the Court
apparently abandoned this fairness rationale. In a similar context,122
the Court pointed out that denial of recovery on this basis would
prejudice claimants even more than the application of varying state
laws. 23 Indeed, the Stencel Court, in its discussion of the need for
uniformity, was silent on the issue of the unfairness of subjecting
claimants to nonuniform state laws. 24 In any event, local tort law
already applies to military dependents in suits for damages for physi-
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The FTCA approach to the choice-of-law ques-
tion is a codification of the traditional doctrine of lex loci dilecti, which looks to the
law of the place of wrong. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934); R.
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 266 (2d ed. 1980). This approach,
which has been found to be inadequate and problematical, see id. at 266-67, has
been rejected by the majority of courts in favor of the modern interest-analysis
approach to choice of law. Id. at 308. Interest analysis considers the policies underly-
ing potentially conflicting tort laws in order to determine the interest of each forum
in applying its own law. Id. at 301.
121. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142-43 (1950). The Feres Court noted
that, unlike a private citizen, "a soldier on active duty has no ...choice [where he
resides] and must serve any place or... any number of places in quick succession."
Id. at 143. Consequently, the Court reasoned that "[iut would hardly be a rational
plan of providing for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them
dependent upon geographic considerations over which they have no control and to
laws which fluctuate in existence and value." Id. Adopting this rationale, one court
denied a cause of action to the wife of a serviceman for loss of consortium arising
from her husband's service-connected injuries. Harrison v. United States, 479 F.
Supp. 529, 531 (D. Conn. 1979), afJ'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 828 (1980). The court argued that because the serviceman's wife, like the
serviceman himself, has no choice where her husband serves, it makes no sense to
have her right to recovery depend upon his geographic military assignment. Id. at
534-35.
122. In Muniz v. United States, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), two prisoners brought suit
against the United States under the FTCA seeking damages for personal injuries
incurred while they were confined in federal prisons. Id. at 150-51. The Court noted
that "the prisoners' opportunities to recover may be affected by differences in state
law over which they have no control, a position shared by service personnel whose
location is determined by government order rather than personal volition." Id. at
161.
123. Id. at 162.
124. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977); see
From Feres to Stencel, supra note 68, at 1119-20.
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cal injuries, incurred independently of any injury to servicemen, even
when these actions depend upon the fortuitous placement of the serv-
iceman. 2 5
The Feres Court considered the absence of nationwide uniformity
to be undesirable not only for the serviceman, but for the military as
well. Because the relationship between the government and members
of its armed forces is " 'distinctively federal in character,' "120 the
Court indicated that the law that governs that relationship should be
" 'derived from federal sources.' ",127 Similarly, the Stencel Court
expressed the fear that the vital function of the military in protecting
national security would be hindered by making state law, as opposed
to federal law, govern the liability of the military.1 2  Because the
"Armed Services perform a unique, nationwide function in protecting
the security of the United States" and to that end "frequently move
large numbers of men, and large quantities of equipment, from one
end of the continent to the other," the Court indicated that it would
be undesirable for the United States to "permit the fortuity of the situs
of the alleged negligence to affect the liability of the Government." 20
The crux of the Feres-Stencel analysis of the uniformity factor is
whether the relationship between the plaintiff and the government is
125. Typically, these cases arise when dependents of servicemen are admitted to
military hospitals because of their relation to military personnel and while there
suffer physical injuries as a result of medical malpractice. E.g., Bridgford v. United
States, 550 F.2d 978, 979-80 (4th Cir. 1977); Buck v. United States, 433 F. Supp.
896, 898 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446, 448 (D.S.C.
1968); Larrabee v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 613, 614 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
126. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950) (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)); accord Johnson v. United States, 631
F.2d 34, 35-36 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Schnurman v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 435 (E.D. Va. 1980); Becton v. United States, 489
F. Supp. 134, 137 n.5 (D. Mass. 1980); Eckles v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 108,
110 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
127. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950) (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 306 (1947)); accord Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d
171, 173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961); see Note, Stencel Aero
Engineering Corporation v. United States: An Expanion of the Feres Doctrine to
Include Military Contractors, Subcontractors and Suppliers, 29 Hastings L.J. 1217,
1223-25 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Expansion of Feres.].
128. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
129. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority's reason-
ing, noting that other government agencies that also perform "a unique, nationwide
function" and have "personnel and equipment in all parts of the country" are
nevertheless subject to liability under the FTCA. Id. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For further criticism of the majority's analysis, see Expansion of Feres, supra note
127, at 1225-26.
130. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977);
Hinkie v. United States. 524 F. Supp. 277, 282-83 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v. United
States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980). One court,
however, focused not on the relationship of the parties, but on whether the claims
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"distinctively federal" in nature.1 30  Should such a relationship exist,
then subjecting the military to varying standards of care and liability
would arguably impair its function.13 1  Where no such federal rela-
tionship exists, however, the government, including the military, has
been routinely subject to diverse state laws.132 Unlike its relationship
with a soldier or, as in Stencel, a military supplier, 33 the govern-
ment's relationship with a serviceman's family member is not distinc-
tively federal, nor does it become so when the family member has a
claim against the government, even if it is derived from the alleged
negligence of the United States toward an active duty serviceman.Y"
Indeed, the family member is a civilian. 35 Just as there is no compel-
ling reason to apply uniform federal law to the civilian injured by
military activities 36 so, too, such a reason does not exist where the suit
is brought by an injured family member.
C. Military Discipline
Justifying the Feres decision on the theory that tort suits brought by
servicemen may adversely affect military order and discipline, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Brown,' 37 noted that:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if such suits under the Tort
were distinctively federal in character. Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918,
922 (D.D.C. 1981). This led the court to reason that because there would be no claim
but for military service, to allow the suit "would undercut the need to maintain a
single standard of government liability for its wide ranging military operations." Id.
(footnote omitted). This reasoning ignores the long-standing and uncontroverted
precedent of granting relief to family members of servicemen for injuries incurred
independent of any injury to the serviceman, even if such injuries would not have
resulted but for the serviceman's military service. See supra note 125.
131. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
132. See, e.g., Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois
law); Craft v. United States, 542 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying
Alabama law); Pierson v. United States, 527 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying
Washington law); Bissell v. McElligott, 369 F.2d 115, 118 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying
Missouri law), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 917 (1967); Williams v. United States, 352 F.2d
477, 479 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying Georgia law); Simpson v. United States, 484 F.
Supp. 387, 392 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law).
133. See supra notes 45, 70, 126-29 and accompanying text.
134. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282-83 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v.
United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980);
Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D. Mass. 1951), affd, 195 F.2d
494 (1st Cir. 1952); 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 156, at 5-146.9.
135. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282-83 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Sigler v.
LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 198 (D. Md. 1980); Herring v. United States, 98 F. Supp.
69, 70 (D. Colo. 1951); 1 L. Jayson, supra note 4, § 156, at 5-146.9.
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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Claims Act were allowed for orders negligently given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty, led the Feres Court
to read that Act as excluding claims of that character.3 8
The extent to which the claimant is subject to military authority at the
time of the negligent act is a key factor in determining the effect of a
suit on the maintenance of military discipline. 39 The more atten-
uated the connection, the less offensive are tort suits to military disci-
pline. A severe threat to military discipline would be posed if an active
duty serviceman had the right to bring suit in tort for injuries incurred
while carrying out specific orders. 40 Some courts have held that even
if the serviceman is not performing duties when injured but is merely
subject to military discipline, serious adverse consequences to military
discipline would still result should he be granted the right to sue in
138. Id. Some courts have suggested that the military discipline rationale articu-
lated in Brown best explains the Feres rule. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,
162 (1963) (dictum); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. May 17, 1982); Hunt v. United States,
636 F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980); seeJacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 Hastings L.J.
1281, 1286-87 (1973). Other courts, however, have held that a finding of adverse
effects on military discipline is not necessary for an injury to be incident to service.
See Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980); Watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980, 985 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 587 F.2d 279 (5th
Cir. 1979). That courts have taken an increasingly active role in reviewing milltary
decisions has led some commentators to question the continued significance of the
military discipline rationale. From Feres to Stencel, supra note 68, at 1109-18; see
Rhodes, supra note 54, at 42.
139. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); Jefferson v. United
States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950); Glorioso v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Miss. 1971)
(mem.); Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971), affd per
curiam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).
140. Rhodes, supra note 54, at 42. A special hierarchial relationship exists between
a soldier and his superiors that demands the soldier's strict obedience to the com-
mands of his superiors. See Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in
Controlling the Military, 49 Ind. L.J. 539, 561 (1974); Westmoreland, Military
Justice-A Commander's Viewpoint, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 5, 5 (1971). As the
Supreme Court noted in In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890), "[a]n army is not a
deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question
can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in
the soldier. Vigor and efficiency on the part of the officer and confidence among the
soldiers in one another are impaired if any question be left open as to their attitude to
each other." Id. at 153. To permit a cause of action for negligent orders given or
negligent acts committed by a soldier's superiors would undermine this relationship.
Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3d Cir. .1981) (en banc), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. May 17, 1982); see Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518,
520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950);
Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curtam,
455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972); Rhodes, supra note 54, at 42. It might lead soldiers to
lose confidence in the judgment of their superiors or question the wisdom of their
orders. See id.
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tort.14' Other courts disagree, observing that such tort suits would
interfere with military discipline only minimally, if at all, because in
such cases there is no direct connection between discipline and the
cause of the injury.' 42  If the lawsuit is brought by a serviceman or
veteran not subject to military discipline, courts are even less con-
cerned about the effect of the suit on the maintenance of military
141. In Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per
curiam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972), the court denied a wrongful death action on
behalf of a serviceman who, on his way to off-post liberty, was killed while riding in
an automobile struck by a switch engine within the confines of the military base. Id.
at 1087-88. The court relied on the Feres decision. Because "[the accidents which
gave rise to [the] Feres . . . cases were neither directly nor clearly related to disci-
pline," the court reasoned that "Feres cannot be explained on the ground of specific
disciplinary problems .... Feres can only be explained on the ground that the
enforcement of army discipline in general is more difficult if persons involved in
enforcing discipline may be treated as the causative agents of suits against the United
States brought by persons who are the subjects of army discipline." Id. at 1088
(emphasis added); accord Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 493-94 (8th Cir.
1980) (rehearing en banc); Glorioso v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Miss.
1971) (mem.) (citing Coffey with approval). Most courts, however, do not rationalize
the Feres decision in terms of military discipline, but simply hold that an action for
injuries suffered by an active duty serviceman, even if it would have no disruptive
effects on military discipline or morale, is incident to service and therefore barred by
the Feres rule. E.g., Torres v. United States, 621 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1980); Veillette
v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980); Lowe v. United States, 440 F.2d
452, 452-53 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); Gursley v.
United States, 232 F. Supp. 614, 615-17 (D. Colo. 1964).
142. The first case to require a nexus between the injury and military discipline
was Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965). The court held
that a soldier, who had obtained a pass authorizing him to leave the military base on
personal business, could maintain suit against the United States under the FTCA for
injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident that occurred as he was
leaving the base. Id. at 628-29. Finding that the soldier was not "performing duties
of such a character as to undermine traditional concepts of military discipline if he
were permitted to maintain a civil suit for injuries resulting therefrom," the court
reasoned that the injury was not service-related. Id.; accord Miller v. United States,
643 F.2d 481, 498 (8th Cir. 1980) (rehearing en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting);
Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980); Rhodes, supra note 54,
at 42. The Sixth Circuit, in Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969),
distinguished between injuries arising incident to service and those occurring in the
line of duty, noting that the latter is a narrower standard. Id. at 358. By holding that
Feres bars only injuries that arise out of or in the course of military duty, id. at 358-
60, the Hale court has arguably adopted the Downes test. Coffey v. United States,
324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiarn, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th
Cir. 1972). The Downes test, however, has been subject to much criticism. Hen-
ninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815-16 & n.3 (9th Cir.) (exceedingly complex),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353, 354 (1st Cir.
1971) (per curiam) (leads to "invocation of Pandora's Box"); Coffey v. United States,
324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (inconsistent with Feres), aff'd per curiam,
455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).
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discipline. 43 Finally, when civilians sue under the FTCA for direct
injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the military, courts
routinely grant their claims 144 without even discussing the effects of
such suits on military discipline.
Courts should similarly recognize that when members of a service-
man's family bring suit, the effect, if any, on military discipline is
insignificant. The spouse and children of a soldier are civilians; 145 they
are neither parties to the special relationship that exists between the
soldier and his superiors nor are they subject to military orders. 140
For them to assert in a public forum that military officers were
negligent is less offensive to the military's system of discipline than it
would be for those subject to that system to make the same charge.
In Stencel, the Supreme Court suggested that the court proceeding
itself, regardless of the claimant's military status, is another factor
that may affect military discipline. 147 The Court particularly feared
the consequences of second-guessing military orders and taking the
testimony of members of the military as to each other's decisions and
actions, both of which would likely be involved in a trial. 148  One
court, relying on this reasoning, rejected the plaintiff's argument that
because she, being only a daughter of a soldier, was never a member
of the armed forces, her claim for direct injuries incurred as a result of
143. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (veteran); see Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (servicemen on furlough); Mills v. Tucker, 499
F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (same); Hand v. United States, 260 F.
Supp. 38, 40-41 (M.D. Ga. 1966) (serviceman on pass). The Monaco court noted that
"any claimant whose injury was not the result of negligence occurring while on active
duty should be allowed to recover .... [because] [c]harges of negligent acts taken
when the claimant was not in the service cannot implicate any command decision
involving the claimant." Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981)
(dictum), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982).
144. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D. Mass. 1951), aff'd,
195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952). "The relationship betAveen the Government and a
serviceman's dependents is not 'distinctively federal in character'.... They are not
subject to the orders of superior officers ... they are not 'serving the Government,'
they are not 'on duty' . . . . It does not follow that, because these dependents enjoy
privileges by reason of their relation to the serviceman, their rights to sue are derived
from the serviceman's status." Id.; see Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277,
282-83 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Jessup v. United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op.
at 2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980).
147. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). The
concern about the effect of judicial scrutiny on military discipline was expressed
many years earlier in Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
148. 431 U.S. at 673.
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negligently inflicted injuries to her father would not have any adverse
effect on military discipline. 49
Such an extension of Stencel is unwarranted.s ° There will always
be some interference with the military function when judicial review
is granted.,5, Interference alone, however, is not sufficient to bar the
claim. 152  Actions brought by civilians or off-duty servicemen for
injuries arising from the alleged negligence of military personnel, but
independent of any injury to a serviceman, may involve second-guess-
ing military orders 153 or require testimony of military officers. '5 Yet,
these actions have never been thought to sufficiently threaten military
discipline so as to warrant their dismissal.' 5s Because the threat to
military discipline is similarly tenuous and remote in suits by family
members of servicemen,' 56 this factor alone is insufficient to warrant
their bar.1'
149. Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133-34 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S. May 24, 1982).
150. See Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v.
United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980).
151. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971).
152. Cf. Schlanger v. United States, 586 F.2d 667, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1978) (judicial
review of internal military affairs), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979); Mindes v.
Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); Lane v. Secretary of the Army,
504 F. Supp. 39, 41-42 (D. Md.) (same), aff'd mem., 639 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1980);
Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F. Supp. 343, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (same).
153. See Rhodes, supra note 54, at 42.
154. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1980).
155. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112-13 (1954); Rhodes, supra note
54, at 42; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
156. Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v.
United States, No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980). The
effect on military discipline was particularly remote in Hinkie. There the court noted
that because the injuries to the serviceman's children manifested themselves decades
after the government's negligent act, "[t]he undermining of discipline or refusal to
follow orders present less of a problem because of the time lapse here involved." 524
F. Supp. at 284. On the other hand, one court stated, without explanation, that a
suit for indirect consequences of military orders would have a similar adverse effect
on military discipline as a suit for direct consequences. Lombard v. United States,
530 F. Supp. 918, 922 (D.D.C. 1981). The effect of these two actions on military
discipline, however, is not similar. Suits for indirect consequences of military orders,
contrary to those for direct consequences, are brought by non-military personnel who
are not subject to military authority, and therefore pose less of a threat to the
maintenance of military discipline. See supra notes 13946 and accompanying text.
Moreover, because the negligent orders were given over three decades before the
manifestation of the injuries, Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 919 n.1
(D.D.C. 1981), any effect on military discipline would be slight. See Hinkie v.
United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
157. In Stencel, the effect of the court proceeding on the maintenance of military
discipline "weigh[ed] against permitting any recovery," 431 U.S. at 673, but was not
dispositive. Rather, it was the combined weight of all three factors that ultimately
led the Court to bar Stencel's cross-claim. Id. at 672-73. When the suit is brought by
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D. Balancing the Feres Factors
To determine whether dependents of servicemen have a right to sue
under the FTCA for their own injuries, courts should use the Feres
factors to balance the potential hardship to the claimant if the action
is barred against the anticipated burden on the government if suit is
permitted. 5 8  Although the adverse effect of actions for wrongful
death on the military function is questionable, the damages to depen-
dents of servicemen are mitigated by their entitlement to death bene-
fits under the VBA. 59 Hence, to deny suit for wrongful death under
the FTCA is not unfair. Family members are not entitled, however, to
veterans' benefits for their own physical injuries, and therefore it
would be particularly harsh to bar these claims. 60 Moreover, any
adverse consequences on the military function that would result from
family members' actions for their own physical injuries would be
negligible. Subjecting the military to diverse standards of care and
liability would not interfere with the performance of its vital function
because the relationship between the claimant and the United States is
not "distinctively federal in character."' 61 Furthermore, because the
claimant is a civilian and therefore not subject to the military's system
family members of servicemen for physical injuries, however, the only factor that
arguably weighs against recovery is the effect of the court proceeding on the mainte-
nance of military discipline. Both the non-availability of veterans' benefits and the
non-existence of a distinctively federal relationship, on the other hand, weigh for
permitting the action. See supra notes 113-19, 133-36 and accompanying text. It is
therefore improper to rely on Stencel's analysis of the effects of the court proceeding
alone to bar claims brought against the United States by family members of service-
men for their own personal injuries.
158. See Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 493-95 (8th Cir. 1980) (rehearing
en banc); Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1978); Hinkie
v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 282-84 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jessup v. United States,
No. Civ. 79-271-TUC-RMB, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1980). In a similar
context, the Fifth Circuit, in Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971),
established a balancing test to determine the scope of judicial review of internal
military affairs. Id. at 201. It ruled that courts should weigh the "nature and strength
of the [serviceman's] challenge to the military determination" and the "potential
injury to the [serviceman] if review is refused" against the "type and degree of
anticipated interference with the military function" and the "extent to which the
exercise of military expertise or discretion is involved." Id. The Mindes test has been
favorably received by other circuits confronted with the question of whether to
review an internal military decision. Schlanger v. United States, 586 F.2d 667, 671
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979); Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp.
900, 904-05 (D. Minn. 1981); Lane v. Secretary of the Army, 504 F. Supp. 39, 41-43
(D. Md.), aJ'd mem., 639 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1980); Cushing v. Tetter, 478 F. Supp.
960, 965-66 (D.R.I. 1979); Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F. Supp. 343, 349
(W.D. Pa. 1978). Only one circuit has declined to adopt the Mindes test. Dillard v.
Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981).
159. See supra notes 81, 109-12 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 97, 113-18 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
1266 (Vol. 50
THE FERES DOCTRINE
of order and discipline, any threat to the integrity of that system
would be remote. 62 To grant family members' actions for their own
physical injuries would promote justice by providing a remedy to
those who would otherwise be without.
CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity, whose origin dates from the Middle Ages, is a
present-day anachronism. For years the doctrine caused widespread
injustice by denying private persons a remedy for wrongs committed
by agents or employees of the government. In enacting the FTCA,
Congress waived the government's immunity from suits sounding in
tort. Cognizance of both the past and potential injustices of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity demands that the FTCA be read broadly.
Permitting family members of servicemen to bring suit against the
United States under the FTCA for personal injuries arising from the
negligence of military personnel toward active duty servicemen would
effectuate the purpose of the Act without jeopardizing the ability of
the military to ensure our national security. Admittedly these claim-
ants may face serious difficulties of proof at trial. Nevertheless, grant-
ing them the opportunity to seek redress provides an avenue for justice
where before there had been no path.
Richard S. Lehmann
162. See supra notes 144-46, 151-57 and accompanying text.
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